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Alternatives for an international climate regime?
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Reviewed by Axel Michaelowa*
Center for Comparative and International Studies, Political Economy of Development, Institute of Political Science,
University of Zurich, Affolternstrasse 56, 8050 Zurich, Switzerland
Mainstream economists – probably best embodied by
William Nordhaus – often see climate change as an
issue that, at best, warrants some low-level carbon taxes.
Moreover due to the public good character of GHG emis-
sions mitigation, any international climate policy regime
that goes beyond business-as-usual is seen as elusive.
Dieter Helm and Cameron Hepburn from the University
of Oxford bring together 22 contributions that mainly follow
this argumentation. As with so many edited volumes, the
quality of chapters varies considerably. Although some
enrich the literature, others are little less than ideological
position papers. The ideological starting point of the
endeavour becomes clear even in the introduction, with
Helm and Hepburn intending to show ‘why so little has yet
been achieved’ (p. 1) as global emissions ‘just keep going
up’ (p. 4). In their view, this is due to mitigation costs that
are higher than originally thought, pervasive rent seeking,
problems with enforcement of obligations and eventually
the sheer complexity of the climate policy regime. They
want to do away with the ‘promise of a relatively cheap
transition to a low-carbon economy that has seduced
politicians into avoiding the very hard issues’ (p. 4).
The book consists of five major parts. The first, ‘Revisiting
the economics of climate change’, brings together six con-
tributions of a generic nature. Dieter Helm sets out by criti-
cizing climate policy for its limited achievements. He
singles out the Kyoto Protocol for a scathing criticism that
in my view is undeserved, as the creators of the Protocol
never thought it could solve the climate change issue. The
Protocol was just seen as a tiny first step towards this aim.
None of Helm’s criticisms of the Protocol goes beyond the
standard arguments of neoclassical economists. In this
context, it is surprising that he favours a consumption-based
allocation of emissions allowances. A detailed critique of the
Stern Report’s mitigation cost estimates is essentially based
on a distrust of bottom-up estimates of mitigation potential.
Helm flatly dismisses that energy efficiency improvements
have a relevant mitigation potential and argues that Stern’s
discount rates are too low. Nevertheless, he avoids provid-
ing an alternative mitigation cost estimate. It is bewildering
that the chapter ends with a call to remove some elements
of national sovereignty in order to set up a new international
institution to deal with climate policy.
Hepburn and Stern provide a good overview about
international climate policy, with valuable sections on the
role of public opinion and the political economy of large
financial transfers. They also summarize the role of carbon
prices, CDM reform, technology policy, avoided defo-
restation and adaptation finance. Barrett provides well-
rehearsed game-theory arguments about why a global
climate policy regime is unenforceable. In his view, the
Montreal Protocol cannot serve as an example for climate
policy as it addressed a problem for which a relatively
cheap technical solution was readily available. His coun-
terintuitive argument to break climate policy into many
small pieces by unravelling the basket of Kyoto gases
and replacing Kyoto with sectoral agreements is unfortu-
nately not underpinned by specific reasons other than
the political potential to apply different pressure points.
In my view, a global approach perfectly allows ‘logrolling’
and thus should be favoured over a disaggregated
solution.
Garnaut et al. give a lucid account of why higher rates of
emissions continue to increase in advanced developing
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countries compared to the estimates from the scenario
exercise underlying IPCC projections. In a very data-rich
exercise, they show that economic growth was higher
than expected, energy efficiency improvements tapered
off, and coal shares increased. They explain that the finan-
cial crisis of 2008 has not altered these factors to any rel-
evant extent.
Brekke and Johansson-Stenman discuss the behav-
ioural economics of climate change but apparently forget
that the key behavioural items influencing emissions are
consumption choices. Their chapter concentrates on the
choice of discount rates and how fairness of negotiation
outcomes is perceived. They introduce the notion of ‘self-
serving bias’ which is a useful metric for reading the chap-
ters in Part II.
Part II, on ‘Global players and agreements’, discusses
the climate policy positions of China, India, the US and
the EU, together with an assessment of climate change
issues relating to Africa. As is often the case, some of
these articles are apologetic regarding their home
country’s negotiation position. Collier et al. describe the
challenges to adaptation and mitigation in Africa but remain
rather generic. Their discussion of adaptation does not
provide a single reference to the rich body of adaptation
literature, whereas the discussion of the CDM in the
chapter’s mitigation section ignores the existing CDM
rules.
Pan et al. estimate the emissions embodied in Chinese
export products at 1.7 billion tonnes CO2e, with the clear
aim of allocating those emissions to the importing
countries. This is a case of ‘self-serving bias’. Given that
China handsomely benefits from its exports, there is no
intrinsic reason that the responsibility for the emissions
should not belong to China. Pan et al. use an input–output
table of 2002, assuming that the emissions intensity of
exports is equivalent to domestic production. However,
in my view, given that export goods are normally of higher
quality, it is likely that they have a lower emissions intensity
than domestic products. This would mean that the esti-
mate seems to be somewhat on the high side.
Joshi and Patel discuss global burden sharing for miti-
gation, and argue that geological carbon capture and sto-
rage (CCS) is prohibitively expensive. Unfortunately, their
chapter neither discusses the negotiation position of the
Indian government nor the emerging domestic policy
instruments.
Stavins proposes a blueprint for a US emissions trading
system. Incredibly, he favours borrowing and a price cap,
without specifying how the resulting incentive problems
can be resolved. To bring emitters on board, he proposes
free allocation of 50% of allowances.
Helm concludes this section with a series of mostly
unsubstantiated statements about EU climate policy. EU
climate policy would not have made ‘as much as one
part per million difference’ (p. 223) and ‘rhetoric, the
plethora of initiatives, directives and intervention has not
been matched by outcomes’ ( p. 223). Key issues where
Helm is off the mark include support of CCS, where the
EU has consistently played a much more active role than
the US. In contrast to the botched Future Gen project in
the US, within the EU the first CCS pilots are operational.
Levels of floor and cap prices for emissions trading are
notoriously difficult to set and essentially make emissions
trading a form of carbon tax. Helm does not like trading
schemes because of a purely theoretical argument about
the slope of the marginal cost curve.
Part III, ‘Low carbon technologies’, discusses nuclear
power, CCS, renewables, geoengineering and the econ-
omics of energy efficiency. Helm addresses the role of
nuclear power in energy policy and gives a good summary
of its history, while dismissing concerns about nuclear fuel
availability and decommissioning costs. In his view, sunk
costs necessitate fixed-price electricity sales contracts for
nuclear power operators. Herzog provides a solid assess-
ment of CCS costs and technical challenges with the only
drawback of focusing a bit too much on the US situation.
Green discusses the mitigation potential of renewable
energy in the UK, but, unfortunately, the ample experi-
ences with renewable energy outside the UK are sidelined.
Andersson et al. provide an initial insight into forestry
inventory issues, but their chapter would have benefitted
from a more detailed treatment of the critical issues of
those inventories.
Victor’s chapter on geoengineering is a highlight of the
book. Written in captivating style, Victor covers a wide
range of literature on the unpleasant, but fascinating
‘geoengineering cocktail’ that might replace classical miti-
gation in the case of non-performance. The notion of
cheap geoengineering would not stand the test of
implementation. He stresses that once ‘masking’ geoengi-
neering has begun, policy makers are doomed to continue
it as failure would lead to a massive pulse of warming. More-
over, one country can act unilaterally. Thus, it is important to
fight against a taboo of geoengineering and to start a highly
transparent geoengineering research programme including
pilot projects to explore the safest and most effective
options, ‘while socializing a community of responsible
geoengineers’ (p. 328). One issue this reviewer has with
Victor’s chapter is his mistrust regarding the IPCC’s ability
to provide assessment of geoengineering options. As the
IPCC was able to assess the controversial topic of CCS in
2005, why should it be unable to assess geoengineering?
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Sorrell discusses the hidden costs of energy efficiency
measures and shows his superb knowledge of current
research about the rebound effect that reduces the volume
of emissions decreases due to energy efficiency improve-
ments. He concludes that rebound effects are non-trivial,
which raises ‘some concerns about whether energy con-
sumption can be significantly decoupled from economic
growth’ (p. 341).
Part IV, on ‘National and international instruments’, has
limited coverage. In addition to a comparison of carbon
taxes and emissions trading and a critique of the CDM, it
features only an NGO proposal for a new form of funding
of mitigation in developing countries. Hepburn starts with
a solid, but standard discussion on the interaction
between emissions taxes and emissions trading that is
useful for the beginner in climate policy. His tendency to
favour carbon taxation is not underpinned by empirical evi-
dence. Wagner et al. describe the Environmental Defense
Fund’s idea of ‘clean investment budgets’, essentially an
allocation of emissions allowances to developing
countries with an initial element of ‘hot air’. Hepburn then
evaluates the performance of the CDM. While conceding
that it is one of the success stories of the Kyoto regime,
he does not see the CDM as being capable of being
upscaled by an order of magnitude in order to meet
post-2012 demand. A large emphasis is on CDM rents
for project developers in host countries, which Hepburn
sees as excessive, proposing the alternative of a multilat-
eral fund to pay just the marginal abatement costs.
A good discussion of CDM reform options follows.
Part V, on institutional architecture, contains two chap-
ters on the current UNFCCC regime and analogies from
other multilateral regimes. Depledge and Yamin argue
that the UNFCCC has been crucial to gathering momen-
tum for climate policy, enabling complex reciprocal deals
and serving as a forum for learning. The reporting and
review system is seen as a major strength, whereas the
North–South conflict is seen as the key weakness.
A further increase in complexity and a lack of simple
decision-making structures are further challenges.
Depeldge and Yamin propose discarding the rigid Annex
structure to create smaller decision-making groups. Their
aim is to create a permanent ‘International Climate Change
Organization’ that ‘may not be the most rational setting in
theory’ (p. 452), but is argued as a political necessity.
Ghosh and Woods discuss how direct incentives could
be set to ensure participation, what monitoring should look
like, and how enforcement of emissions commitments
could be decentralized.
This reviewer agrees with the editors that climate crises
might be a precondition in order to achieve a real break-
through in international climate policy. However, I disagree
that the UNFCCC regime has achieved only very little. The
first application of a global market mechanism, the univer-
sal raising of awareness on climate change and the nurtur-
ing of emissions mitigation industries are no mean feats.
If we build on those achievements and heed some of the
lessons brought together in Helm and Hepburn’s
volume, international climate policy would move forward
substantially.
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